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Culture, Development, and Government:
Reservations in India

Evan Osborne
Wright State University
I. Introduction
The influence of modernization on traditional societies has been studied
extensively. Scholars have paid a great deal of attention to how culture
influences development and vice versa. The economic analysis of how
rent seeking in general and pressure groups in particular affect government behavior is also well-worn territory in development research.1
However, the role of government and rent seeking in mediating the influence between culture and economics has been a little-studied phenomenon.
In this article I use the economic theories of pressure groups and rent
seeking to analyze the change in the social structure of postindependence
India.2 There are two primary findings. The first is that the large role government has in the economic life of India has had a substantial effect on
Indian social evolution, in particular, on caste and tribal loyalties. As a
result, a social structure that would otherwise have become less important
has been maintained and even expanded. Rent seeking thus provides a
positive theory of Indian cultural change. The second finding is that causation also runs from culture to economics and politics. For example,
rent-seeking opportunities combined with a substantial number of readymade pressure groups that existed in India at independence have stunted
the growth of the more traditional groups, such as those found in other
parliamentary democracies in the developing world and elsewhere.
The issues are not simply academic. It is beyond dispute that in India government-dispensed rents are a major phenomenon.3 In her landmark paper on the theory of rent seeking, A. Krueger estimated that the
stakes from a tiny proportion of the rent-seeking opportunities that were
made available by the Indian government amounted to 7.4% of the national income, an estimate raised to 30%–45% in a more comprehensive
study by S. Mohammad and J. Whalley.4 Large stakes presumably imply
 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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large consequences from the pursuit of those stakes, and in this article I
examine how some of those consequences bubble up in unexpected
ways. It should be noted that the theory describes a factor that contributes to India’s postindependence social evolution; it is not an all-encompassing explanation of that evolution. It is, however, a valuable exercise
in intellectual cross-fertilization for two scholarly communities. For economics scholars, India, with its myriad social groups that long predate
the existing Indian state, provides fertile ground to gain insight into how
pressure groups form. For scholars of contemporary Indian politics and
culture, the study is an opportunity to bring to bear on these fields the
stock of knowledge in the rent-seeking literature.
Section II presents a theory of the determinants of pressure-group
formation, and Section III provides the necessary Indian historical priors.
Section IV describes the phenomenon that is of primary interest to us,
namely, that traditional factions in India are becoming increasingly important in politics even as they become less important in economic life.
Section V outlines why existing social science theory cannot explain this
disparity, Section VI explores the ability of pressure-group theory to explain Indian political behavior, and Section VII lays out empirical predictions for India’s future based on the theory presented. Section VIII
concludes.
II. Efficient Pressure-Group Formation
What features define a pressure group? The presumption in existing economic analysis has been that there is a prior common economic interest
that causes citizens to unite in order to influence the government. We
can imagine that before the formation of the state there are economic
fundamentals that in the state’s absence would yield some general-equilibrium pattern of exchange and distribution of wealth and income.
These fundamentals include production technology, preferences, endowments, and nongovernmental institutional arrangements. They give citizens who share certain features in this ex ante state of nature a common
cause. Employees who work on automobile assembly lines (even for different firms), entrepreneurs who produce furniture, and people who believe that the air should be cleaner are all groups whose members are
united by an economically important (in the sense of affecting the general-equilibrium pattern of exchange) common interest.
The economic notion of pressure groups or ‘‘factions’’ can be
traced back at least to the Federalist Papers in the early postrevolutionary
United States.5 Modern economic analysis also stresses economic interests and is not concerned with the sources of factional identity. In the
definition of pressure groups in his highly influential article, G. Becker
was first drawn to economically relevant characteristics: ‘‘Individuals
belong to particular groups—defined by occupation, income, geography,
age, and other characteristics—that are assumed to use political influence to enhance the well-being of their position. Competition among
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these pressure groups for political influence determines the equilibrium
structure of taxes, subsidies, and other political favors.’’6 However, pressure groups need not be defined around economic fundamentals. Instead,
the primary requirement is excludability. If a pressure group is defined
as a set of citizens that exerts resources to influence the government to
maximize its net transfers from those who are not members of the group,
the key task is to exclude those nonmembers from free riding on the
efforts of members. Of course, excludability presumes identifiability.
There must be a way to discern who is and who is not a member and
thus who will pay the taxes and who will receive the subsidies.
Any number of citizens who meet these requirements can, in theory,
join together to apply political pressure. Pressure groups can, in principle, be organized around something as abstract as height or the number
of letters in the surname or something as economically important as the
type of property owned or one’s occupation. Of course, purely economic
factions are commonplace, but this derives from lower marginal transaction costs. To seek out people united by economic interest is often a relatively simple task, because much of the necessary organizing work has
been done in the ordinary business of market exchange. Autoworkers,
for example, gather daily in a relatively small number of production
facilities, and even more dispersed groups such as small-business owners
may be united at relatively low cost in a society in which advanced communications technology is widespread. To organize around a noneconomic criterion may require a significant initial investment, making it
relatively less attractive. To organize all citizens of a particular height in
an excludable way is presumably a relatively costly venture, even though
once such an organization exists, but it is just as capable of exerting political pressure as a group of, say, farmers.
However, in a society in which a government is born at a time when
a number of faction sources, both economic and noneconomic, already
exist, the criteria governing the optimal source of organization are determined at least in part by marginal relative transaction costs. If there are
already social groups with a high degree of excludability, then after the
state appears (or, in India’s case, after the state’s structure was substantially changed at independence) pressure groups may organize along
these lines rather than along class or other economic criteria. India’s
complex, highly identifiable and excludable social structure provided
such an opportunity for traditional social groups to dominate, with results that have profoundly influenced India’s postindependence experience. India is thus a country in which Becker’s ‘‘other factors’’ are worthy of particular attention.
III. A Brief Synopsis of Indian Social Structure
Basic Definitions
The social structure in the Indian subcontinent commonly known as the
caste system has roots that can be traced back thousands of years.7 The
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broad superstructure of traditional Hindu social ordering is the varna
system. When they conquered the indigenous Dasa peoples, the Aryan
people already had a social structure containing three hierarchical social
groups: the Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors and aristocrats), and
Vaisyas (merchants and others). At some point after the conquest, a
fourth varna, the Shudras (peasants, laborers, and servants) emerged.8
Absent from the classification were the groups who later came to be
known as dalits (untouchables), who were entirely excluded from the
varna system and consequently excluded from much of Indian village
life. For the purposes of this article, the primary role of the varna system
was to define a broad hierarchical scheme of social relations within
which thousands of castes and subcastes would be placed.
The caste system is related to, but distinct from, the varna hierarchy. Each member of Hindu society was (and for the most part still is)
born into a jati, or caste, which in turn usually belongs to a varna. Castes
historically tended to be occupationally specific and confined to particular regions or even villages. The fact that caste membership was conferred by birth meant that one’s occupation was largely predetermined.
A complex network of relationships and obligations among the jatis, formally known as the jajmani system, emerged that mimicked exchange in
a conventional monetary economy. Within a village, each caste traditionally had an obligation to perform its specific services for the benefit of
others in the community, even as its members drew on the services of
members of other castes performing their hereditary occupations. It is the
jatis rather than the better-known varnas that form the nuts and bolts of
the caste system.
The Caste System from Its Beginning to Indian Independence
D. Lal argues that caste can be traced to the settling of the Ganges Plain
and the resulting increased importance of the river in production and
commerce. By the sixth century b.c., identifiable subcastes were found
within villages in the plain. It is worth noting that, although it may be
said that Hindu beliefs in some sense ratify the caste system, the system
itself has absorbed a wide variety of non-Hindus over the centuries. The
noted Indian sociologist A. Béteille has remarked on the assimilation of
adherents of Islam, Buddhism, Jainism, and other ostensibly anticaste religions into the caste system.9 When the first caste-based list of reserved
parliamentary seats was published under British rule in 1936, the Sikh
representatives in the Constituent Assembly demanded that converts to
Sikhism who were by birth members of castes on the list be eligible for
seats, a request that was granted by the drafters of the preindependence
1935 constitution. C. J. Fuller claims that India’s New Syrian Christians
are organized into the functional equivalent of castes and that actual
castes often convert to that religion en masse while retaining their jati
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designation. I. Ahmad has also produced a case study of Muslim castes.10
Lal provides a striking description of the incorporation of even the British, despite their best efforts, into the jajmani order:
By the end of the nineteenth century, with the final conversion of the British from nabobs to sahibs, the British increasingly became an upper caste,
on the traditional Indian form—endogamous, occupationally specialized,
pollution-conscious (though its polluting objects were different), and with
hierarchically arranged subcastes. The Viceroy and his court came to resemble the Moghul emperors in its splendour, and the Platonic Guardians
who formed the 900 odd member ICS [Indian Civil Service] becomes the
top caste, looking down upon the other layers—military, service subcastes
(such as teachers and doctors), and below them the commercial subcaste
(the British merchants and planters). On the lowest rung of the AngloIndian ladder were the Eurasians. The British must appear to an unjaundiced eye as having succumbed, despite their earlier intention of reforming
Hindu society, to the traditional Indian social and political pattern.11

The issue that is of primary interest in this article began to emerge
in the early twentieth century. The colonial government conducted its
first census of India in 1881, listing the castes it encountered. Subsequent
censuses in 1891 and 1901 attempted to classify castes by social ranking,
using widely held public opinion as the criterion. The latter census also
differentiated between ‘‘untouchables’’ and other ‘‘backward’’ segments
of the population. The 1911 census was a defining moment in that it contained a list of 10 tests for assessing whether a social group qualified as
a ‘‘depressed class.’’ It was estimated that 42.57 million people passed
at least one of the tests and were so classified.12
After Independence
After independence, Jawaharlal Nehru and other leading members of the
Congress party fervently desired the caste system to disappear and were
confident that it would.13 However, the party also decided to continue the
British practice of reserving seats in the legislature for certain communities, a practice, ironically, that had been widely opposed during colonial
times by independence advocates who viewed it as a divide-and-conquer
strategy. Thus, the nation’s founders elected to establish a list of disadvantaged castes and tribes that would qualify for government assistance
beyond legislative seats. The debate over whether or not the depressed
classes should qualify for ‘‘reservations’’ in government employment,
political representation, and educational slots was far from unanimous.14
In the end, however, articles 341 and 342 of the constitution of India
empowered the Indian president to establish lists of Scheduled Castes
(SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), respectively, that were eligible for
reservations. The two lists were designed to address different problems
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in Indian society. Reservations for SCs were designed to assist groups
who for centuries had been relegated to the lowest rungs of traditional
Hindu society. Scheduled tribes, however, were viewed as groups that
had had little contact with the modern world and whose justification for
receiving assistance was not intrinsically related to Hindu belief.
The lists of SCs and STs did have roots in older census data, and
their modification was designed to be difficult. For example, each group
must be limited to a single state, so that no all-India SCs and STs are
permitted. Once a president issues a list for each state, only an act of
parliament can change it. However, this has occurred numerous times,
and, as shown in Section VI, it has in general proven to be rather easy
to expand membership. In fact, such safeguards as exist for SCs and STs
are absent for the third category of Indians eligible for reservations, the
‘‘Other Backward Classes’’ (OBCs). The original rationale for creating
this additional list was to accommodate the possibility that lists of deprived groups defined only around caste or tribal criteria might have a
modest number of omissions. The power to designate such classes is
found in article 340 of the constitution. Shortly after independence the
government appointed a commission, named for its chair, Kaka Saheb
Kalelkar, to list the OBCs. Although a four-point definition of eligibility
was created, because of a paucity of data, the commission adopted caste
as the primary criterion. As a result, 2,339 groups were designated as
OBCs in 1955 in addition to those that already qualified as SCs and
STs.15 The large number of listed groups and the reliance on caste made
the report unacceptable to the government. In the end the central government elected not to create a nationwide list and instead allowed each
Indian state to create its own list, a step that would prove crucial in
allowing the number of individuals covered by reservations to expand
substantially. Each state is now virtually given carte blanche to define its
OBCs as it chooses.16
In 1978, after the state of Bihar’s decision to provide reservations
for OBCs led to widespread rioting, the central government appointed
the so-called Mandal Commission to investigate the relationship between
OBCs and government at all levels in India. It issued a report in 1980
recommending that 27% of central government civil service jobs be reserved for members of OBCs, in addition to the existing 23% of reservations for SCs and STs. However, the report was ignored until 1990, when
the V. P. Singh government suddenly announced plans to implement the
recommendations. After a rash of protests, civil disorder, and even public self-immolations, the supreme court of India ruled in 1992 in Indra
Sawhney v. Union of India that the central government and all state governments must create a ‘‘permanent body’’ for recommending inclusion
in the OBC lists.17 It also required that there be an exclusion of the
‘‘creamy layer’’ of members of OBCs who were not in need of educa-
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tional and other opportunities and that under no circumstances should
reservations for OBCs exceed 50% of the population.
IV. The Disjunction between Politics and Economics
in Contemporary India
Preexisting Factions in Politics
The most striking aspect of what I call preexisting factions in India is
that they are becoming more important in legislative politics even as
many of them, particularly castes, are rapidly becoming less so in economic activity. That caste, ethnicity, and tribal identity have steadily become more important in Indian voting is beyond dispute. As far back as
the 1960s O. Lynch noted the increasing ability of untouchables to leverage numbers into political power and reservations, and J. Mencher described the same phenomenon in the mid-1970s.18
F. Frankel has documented the efficacy of such voting patterns, that
is, the increasing capacity of members of SCs, STs, and OBCs to use
voting, either alone or in coalition with other groups, to acquire additional reservations at the state and national levels. Béteille notes the increasing importance of caste in the composition of political bodies at all
levels of government. The agility of preexisting factions in obtaining
rents is demonstrated in M. N. Srinivas’s description of caste fluidity in
the state of Gujarat. In order to obtain power in that state, the rajput
group admitted the populous but low-ranking kolis to the higher Kshatriya varna in exchange for their political support. He also describes the
ability of Yadavs from northern India to unite across linguistic lines to
strengthen their power. J. Manor describes the same phenomenon of using caste to build bridges across economically irrelevant lines in his discussion of the coalition that was formed in 1947 between various lingayat and vokkaliga castes in Karnataka.19
Analysis of recent Indian elections confirms that caste is, if anything, becoming more important in national and state politics. Although
during the early decades after Indian independence national politics were
dominated by groups with national agendas, such as the Congress and
Communist parties, since the late 1980s there has been a surge in the
political strength of parties whose explicit or implicit raison d’être is to
represent single preexisting factions or blocs of such groups. Coalitions
routinely compete for the allegiance (or membership) of these parties.
C. P. Bhambri has documented that ‘‘communal’’ interests, which in the
Indian context is a code for ethnic, religious, and caste allegiances, were
a primary consideration in the 1989 national elections. Although scholarly analyses of the most recent polling results are, to the best of my
knowledge, not yet available, journalistic accounts of the 1996 and 1998
national elections are virtually unanimous in describing the importance
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of preexisting identity, whether based on caste, tribe, or other ethnicity,
in determining how increasingly more Indian people vote.20
Caste in Economic Life
At first blush, economic theory may seem ill placed to explain the increasing importance of caste and other loyalties in Indian politics. India
has undergone a number of significant economic changes in the last 150
years, particularly since independence, which, many have argued, should
have eroded the caste system’s viability. Lal argues that the increased
commercialization of agriculture, the introduction of modern technology
(including irrigation), and the introduction of property rights in land
eliminated much of the economic rationale for the jajmani system. Cash
payments have in fact substantially replaced the traditional caste-based
bartering of services, although patronage relations between those with
and those without land still exist in rural India.
The most obvious manifestation of the decreased importance of
caste in Indian economic life is the sharply diminished role of castebased occupational specialization. D. Gupta argues that members of traditional castes have been performing other castes’ occupations at least
since 1891, although even now some people devote time to these traditional tasks. He also argues that, since independence, the caste system
has not been a particular hindrance to the adoption of new production
techniques or occupational mobility.21 According to Béteille, at independence in 1947, fewer than half the people in the caste system were
primarily devoted to their caste’s occupation. Mencher claims that at independence only 10%–15% of the Indian people were performing traditional caste jobs and that most of them had other sources of income as
well.
After independence, the trend only accelerated. Lal has described
the decreasing importance of caste in determining one’s occupation, and
many scholars, for example, D. Quigley, argue that its role in economic
life generally is now small. M. Marriott documents that although the
family names held by members of particular castes are associated with
specific occupations, members actually perform many jobs, even in the
caste system’s rural heartland. G. S. Ghurye describes how Brahmins, in
particular, are occupied in a number of areas other than the priesthood,
for example, the government, the military, agriculture, shopkeeping, and
wage labor. Caste is also becoming less of a determinant of individual
prosperity. As early as 1962, Srinivasan asserted that although caste and
standard of living were somewhat correlated, the link was hardly decisive.22 Béteille also found that only the very lowest castes are uniformly
poor. Other than that, there is considerable variance in wealth and income within castes.
If anything, the relationship between caste and occupation (other
than government employment) will only decline in the coming years.
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The reason is that an increasingly urbanized and technologically sophisticated India will find that occupational rigidity based on caste will be progressively more costly. M. Searle-Chatterjee and U. Sharma assert that
caste is quickly becoming unimportant in occupational choice in cities.23
Béteille reports a similar pattern in private-sector managerial jobs. The
demands an increasingly liberal, urban, specialized, technologically
progressing India places on labor markets to match efficiently human
capital to tasks have long since made caste increasingly less important in
Indian economic life. The seemingly odd combination of the decreasing
importance of caste in economics with the increasing importance of caste
in politics is the puzzle that this article seeks to explain.
V. Other Theories of Caste and Their Explanatory Power
Insights from Anthropology and Sociology
Caste has been largely neglected by economic theorists and has never
been analyzed from a rent-seeking perspective. There is, however, a substantial body of theory in the sociology and anthropology literature that
must be judged in part by its ability to explain the disjunction outlined
in the previous section.
The dominant theory in anthropology and sociology is that of L.
Dumont. He undertook a landmark study of Indian social structure in an
attempt to create a comprehensive theory of hierarchical relations within
societies. Caste is a scheme that functions to maintain such a hierarchical
structure in Indian society, and it has two fundamental principles. The
first is the separation of purity from impurity. The caste system allows
members of certain groups to avoid defilement caused by various types
of contact with members of other groups. Rules govern physical contact
and social interaction between members of different groups. For example, the requirement to avoid entering the home of a member of an impure group operates best at the varna level, for here the definitions, when
they are adhered to, are clear and fairly consistent throughout much of
India. Three varnas (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and Vaisyas) are believed to
be ‘‘twice born,’’ entitled to a second birth at the end of life, while the
Shudras and the dalits are not. The second principle of the caste system
is the separation of purity and power, which Dumont claims makes Indian social structure unique. He asserts that the Indian caste-based society is unlike all other societies in that it accords the highest status to a
group (the Brahmins) that does not hold economic or military power.24
Dumont claims that purity and pollution are in play at the jati level
as well. Although it can be argued that the status of a caste within the
pollution rules of an Indian village is a function of its place in the varna
hierarchy, it is also true that individual jatis may ‘‘move up’’ by imitating the behavior of higher castes. They may, for example, imitate such
Brahmin behavior as vegetarianism in order to move from one varna to
another or to change the rules that control their social contact with other
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members of society. This process, known as ‘‘sanskritization,’’ means
that within the varna structure the place of jatis, as well as the web of
social obligations among jatis, is forever in flux.
Social scientists have also formulated other theories. For G. Myrdal,
India’s poverty leads to a rigidity in social structure, casting the varna
and jati systems in stone. Quigley describes the entire caste system as
simply a vehicle for some groups in society to engage in ‘‘domination’’
over others, although the dominance of dominance as a strategy for all
feasible coalitions in society is never outlined. G. Berreman argues more
specifically that caste performs the same function that ethnicity does in
other societies in separating the rulers from the ruled. For Mencher, caste
remains viable as a way to frustrate cohesion among various economically united classes. By contrast, R. Prasad argues that caste divisions
are simply the traditional class structure frozen in time, although it remains unclear why such a structure should prove so difficult to dislodge
in the face of overwhelming economic change.25
These theories have one glaring weakness: their inability to predict
the caste system’s resilience. In their day, both Karl Marx and Max Weber were confident that industrialization would soon sweep caste identity
away.26 This prediction still finds confident—if increasingly inaccurate—repetition in a number of Indian intellectual and political voices.27
Although caste membership is progressively less important with respect
to the division of labor in India, it is progressively more important in
Indian politics, and for many Indians it is still a bedrock part of their
identity. Numerous scholars (e.g., Béteille, M. Robinson) argue that
caste perseveres because of the force of social sanction, but this too begs
the question of why such ‘‘force’’ could for so long overwhelm presumably powerful economic forces.28
Existing Economic Theory
Economic analysis of the caste system is surprisingly scarce. What little
analysis exists examines a caste-based (i.e., immutably defined at birth)
division of labor and the conditions under which it can endure as a stable
equilibrium without fatal defection by coalitions. Both Lal and G. Akerlof have offered such analyses, both speculating that Indian conditions
have allowed this kind of equilibrium to persist for centuries. J. Scoville
has also presented a model of the exchange between castes and its implications for population growth given that transaction costs prevent exiting
the caste economy.29
Akerlof and Scoville did not make predictions about the future of
the caste system. Lal did, but he was puzzled that the arrival of the British Raj did not shatter the caste system. He did take comfort in the fact
that the role of caste in determining occupation has steadily decreased.
However, caste as a means of identification with respect to the government is, if anything, increasing.
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VI. Pressure-Group Theory and Current Indian Social Structure
and Governance
An important aspect of the caste system and India’s tribal mosaic is that
it facilitates the formation of pressure groups on a government that has
many rents to dispense and many factionalized citizens eager to seek
them. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of reservation-based rent
seeking in India is that it has occurred primarily through the most ordinary of means: voting. Preexisting factions often obtain rents through the
government simply by using their political strength to insure that their
groups are listed as STs, SCs, or OBCs. The ease of voting on the basis
of preexisting factions is that agency problems are minimized. While
Becker made the free-rider problem a central element of his theory, voting is usually sufficiently low cost that organizing factions along caste
lines is a simple task. Though there is a modest cost to voting, there can
also be social penalties (particularly in rural areas, where monitoring
costs are lower) for not voting, and even with a secret ballot there is no
incentive to defect by voting for someone else if one’s factional identity
is excludable. The utility of voting on the basis of caste rather than some
alternate principle is comparatively high, and so it is not surprising that
caste has proven such a persistent means of factional organization in
India.
The logic of the power of preexisting factions in India is quite simple. Once an aggressively interventionist government exists, the choice
facing citizens is whether to obtain rents via caste and tribe or via some
other means. Given that caste and tribe memberships require little in the
way of organizing costs and are easy to verify, so that it is difficult for
members of one group to ‘‘pass’’ as members of another, the continuance of these identities as a powerful force in Indian society seems almost inevitable.
There is some evidence that electoral politics and reservations have
transformed and been transformed by the preexisting social structure.
The effect that electoral politics and reservations have on social structure
is demonstrated by S. Kaviraj, who describes the manner in which distinct, unrelated untouchable castes over time were transformed into
Scheduled Castes—a term that is meaningless in Hinduism—that have
become coalitions into which various jatis and other groups seek to
merge.30 The most obvious evidence of the effect social structure has on
the political system comes from the increasing prominence of reservations themselves as an election issue and, in particular, the increased
willingness of politicians to promise expansion of reservations in order
to win votes.31 Several other aspects of Indian society that cannot be explained by existing social science scholarship can be illuminated by pressure-group theory: the relentless expansion in the proportion of Indians
covered by reservations, the lack of conventional class cohesion in Indian politics, the correlation between caste size and rents received, and
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TABLE 1
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes since Independence
Scheduled Castes

Scheduled Tribes

Total

Year

Number

%

Number

%

Number

%

1951
1961
1971
1981
1991

51,344,000*
64,449,000*
80,005,000*
107,737,000‡
138,864,000§

14.4
14.7
14.6
15.75
16.9

19,147,000*
29,846,000*
36,409,000†
51,629,000†
67,760,000§

5.6
6.23
6.8
7.76
8.1

70,491,000
94,295,000
116,414,000
159,366,000
206,624,000

20.0
20.93
21.4
23.51
25.0

* Marc Galanter, Competing Inequalities: Law and the Backward Classes in Contemporary India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991).
† Government of India, Census of India, 1981 (New Delhi: Registrar General and
Census Commissioner, 1981).
‡ Government of India, Census of India, 1981: A Handbook of Population Statistics
(New Delhi: Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 1988).
§ Government of India, Census of India, 1991 (New Delhi: Registrar General and
Census Commissioner, 1991).

the continuing refusal of Indian governments to employ criteria for reservations that are closer to the stated intent of reservations but more costly
in terms of forgone political support.
The Expansion in Covered Groups
The proportion of Indians eligible for reservation has expanded dramatically since independence. Table 1 illustrates the number and proportion
of Indian citizens composing the SCs and STs from 1951 to 1991. Both
categories have expanded in share and number each decade, the only exception being a minor decline in the share of SCs in the population between 1961 and 1971, which S. K. Chatterjee attributes to peculiar circumstances associated with an Indian supreme court directive regarding
the conduct of the 1971 census.32 He notes that many of the vanishing
SCs were simply shifted to the list of STs during this period. Despite the
fact that the two lists were supposed to address different problems in Indian society, enforcement of membership criteria distinguishing between
the SC and ST lists has not been strict.
There are no long-term continuous data for OBCs, but here the increase is potentially extraordinary. In the 1950s the Indian government
estimated that the total population of OBCs was approximately 4.2 million, or 1.2% of the population.33 By 1979 the Mandal Commission was
estimating that 52% of the population belonged to an OBC (in addition
to the existing SCs and STs), and the only reason for recommending that
the reservation quota in education and public employment be capped at
27% was to keep total reservations at less than 50%. The ratification by
the supreme court in Indra Sawhney of the implementation of the Mandal Commission’s recommendations means that three-quarters of the
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Fig. 1.—Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, 1991

population has now been certified as relatively disadvantaged. Potentially half the positions in education and public employment are subject
to such reservations.
In some states, reservations are extended to extraordinarily high
proportions of the population and to groups that were not originally designed to benefit from them. For example, by the later 1980s, 68% of
public university openings in Tamil Nadu were already reserved.34 Figure
1 depicts the proportion of the population in each Indian state and union
territory belonging to SCs and STs, based on the 1991 census.35 It indicates that those groups are a substantial electoral force. Although estimates for OBCs do not exist, work done by other scholars indicates that
their presence on reservation lists can extend the share of the eligible
population to extraordinary levels. In the state of Karnataka, an alliance
between the vokkaligas and lingayats—two numerically dominant but
historically advantaged groups—enabled them to become eligible for
reservations.36 In that state, over 90% of the population is eligible.37 In
Karnataka over 95% is and in Uttar Pradesh the list of OBCs essentially
includes everyone who is not ‘‘twice born’’ plus some who are.38 D. A.
Washbrook claims that the only constraint on caste patronage in Tamil
Nadu will be a drying up of available resources for the state.39 The
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expansion is particularly striking because it was in such stark opposition
to both the hopes of reservation advocates and the wishes of India’s
founders. Reservations in both legislative representation and civil-service
employment, for example, were originally to end within 10 years, and
only a succession of constitutional amendments has allowed them to persevere.
Various castes and tribes in India have also been creative in generating and seizing opportunities to increase the number of listed groups.
Recall that the constitution provides that once a list of SCs or STs within
a state has been established by the prime minister it can be changed only
by a majority vote in the central Parliament. Despite the implicit agreement by India’s founders that the reservation system would be a temporary remedy and that the number of people participating in it would diminish over time, groups have discovered strategies for evading this
intent. Castes and tribes are usually listed only in small portions of a
state. However, due to political pressure the list is often quickly expanded statewide, particularly for castes in other parts of the state who
share the same traditional occupation.
In addition, on a number of occasions states have been split or
merged or have had their borders changed, which required that lists of
SCs, STs, and OBCs be redrawn in each new state. A detailed analysis
of the SC list by S. K. Chatterjee reveals that the number of such castes
in the new states almost invariably increases after such reorganizations.
There is no particularly compelling evidence one way or the other as to
whether agitation by preexisting factions played the dominant role in
these reorganizations. However, the fact that such opportunities frequently arise, regardless of whether political pressure brings them about,
means that initial lists are not carved in stone, so there are frequent opportunities for groups to apply pressure to expand reservations.
Voting, Class Solidarity, and Caste Hierarchy
Applying pressure-group theory to the Indian reservation system also reveals the extent to which preexisting factions have hindered the formation and effectiveness of the types of interest groups common in other
rent-seeking societies. The most obvious manifestation involves the composition and strength of Indian political parties. The common state of
affairs in many parliamentary democracies is to have parties that appeal
to the working class or to the business and upper classes. These parties
exist in India as well, but a number of commentators have remarked that
the standard alliances of citizens of similar economic circumstances that
exist in most other democracies are difficult to build in India.40 Kaviraj
laments the inability of Indian peasants to unite across caste and ethnic
lines. Mencher attributes this noncohesion of class specifically to the attractiveness of caste-based politics, and R. Thakur argues that the traditional social cleavages of caste and ethnicity are far more important than
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economic interests are in shaping factional identity. Specific examples of
caste trumping class are described by Manor for the state of Karnataka
and by Z. Hasan for Uttar Pradesh.41 Given that in India the relative marginal transaction costs for faction organization are lower for the longstanding preexisting factions and that these relative costs should substantially determine the basis for factional organization, this is a predictable
result.
A similarly revealing phenomenon with respect to caste is the mobility of jatis within the varna system in recent years. Recall that both
the traditional varna social codes and the theories described in Section
V imply a rigid maintenance of hierarchical relationships between jatis.
Despite this, it is commonplace for jatis who are not of the same varna
to form shifting alliances in an effort to obtain political power and the
resultant patronage rewards. Gupta and Srinivas describe the mobility of
entire jatis between occupations and the decay of occupations within
jatis, again in contrast to the standard ‘‘dominance’’ models of caste. P.
Brass describes how Muslims, nominally outside the caste system, nonetheless have formed a series of shifting alliances with different castebased parties in various states of India in an attempt to secure access to
power and its rewards.42 None of this seems plausible in a theory in
which the function of caste is to keep a particular subset of society in
power or to avoid the pollution that comes from contact with members
of other subsets. It is, however, perfectly sensible if the primary function
of castes is increasingly to mobilize votes in exchange for postelection
rewards.
Strength in Numbers
Being large helps if a faction is to obtain reservations. With respect to
caste, jatis vary widely in size, from fewer than one hundred to tens of
thousands of members. A priori, one might expect that the castes eligible
for reservations within a state either would be identical to the historical
definition of disadvantaged castes or would have a distribution by size
that is similar to the overall distribution by size among all such traditionally stigmatized castes. Yet pressure-group theory suggests that large
castes are more likely to end up on lists of scheduled castes than chance
would indicate. Other things being equal, large factions are preferred to
small ones by Indian politicians, because they carry more votes. Larger
factions should thus comprise a disproportionate share of the SC, ST,
and OBC lists.
Evidence about the proportion of large and small castes in reservation lists versus that in the population as a whole is not available. However, S. K. Chatterjee has analyzed the change over time in the composition of the SC list among castes of different sizes. As table 2 indicates,
the proportion of large castes among the number of total SCs has modestly but steadily increased while the share of small castes has substan-
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TABLE 2
Size of Castes on the Scheduled-Caste Lists
Caste Type
Largest:
1961
1971
1981
Intermediate:
1961
1971
1981
Smallest:
1961
1971
1981

Number

Percentage of
Listed Castes

214
254
258

21.47
22.90
24.20

712
771
771

71.41
69.53
72.33

71
84
37

7.12
7.57
3.47

Source.—S. K. Chatterjee, The Scheduled
Castes in India (New Delhi: Gyan, 1996).
Note.—‘‘Largest’’ castes are those composed
of at least 1% of a state’s scheduled-caste population. ‘‘Intermediate’’ castes are those composed of
between 0.01% and 1%. ‘‘Smallest’’ castes are
those composed of less than 0.01%.

tially decreased. Further evidence of the importance of caste size in determining inclusion in the SC list comes from many observers of the
Indian political scene. For example, A. R. Khan points out not only that
larger castes have claimed more and more of the proceeds of reservation
over time, but that even ‘‘forward’’ (i.e., twice born) castes are frequently listed as OBCs if they are large enough.43 This suggests that over
time a more efficient way of building electable coalitions is taking hold.
The power of large castes is of interest because it is in contrast to
one of Becker’s central predictions. He asserts that, other things being
equal, small factions have an advantage over large ones in terms of political pressure because they are better able to control free riding. However,
in India, voting is the major manifestation of rent-seeking activity with
respect to reservations, and of course, when it comes to voting, the government prefers having more members to having fewer members. Because factional identity is so easily excludable, the free-riding problem is
comparatively small. Consequently, from the point of view of the various
governments other things being equal, it is more advantageous to court
the larger factions. The result is that the large factions are able to extract
disproportionate rents.
Criteria for Reservations
Since independence, caste has been the most important criterion for determining eligibility for reservations and this holds not just for the SCs
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but for the OBCs as well. A prime stated goal of reservations has been
to improve the welfare of social groups that for historical reasons trail in
economic measures such as income or wealth. It would be fairly straightforward to make eligibility for reservations depend on measures of income and wealth rather than on the imperfectly correlated variables of
caste or tribe. And yet in India this has never been done, even though
official recommendations to use income or wealth are common. For example, a commission appointed by the state of Gujarat to develop a systematic way of determining OBC reservation eligibility recommended
that caste alone not be used, suggesting instead that all those who were
in designated castes and had annual incomes of less than 10,000 rupees
would qualify for reservations. Instead the government elected to implement other recommendations the commission made but to preserve both
its complete freedom to name OBCs and the continued use of caste alone
to identify them.44 Both the Singh government’s decision to implement
the Mandal Commission recommendations and the subsequent supreme
court ruling in Indra Sawhney also upheld the principle that not poverty
per se but membership in what Article 15 of the Indian constitution calls
‘‘socially and educationally backward classes’’ will determine reservation eligibility.
This suggests that electoral considerations rather than broader social
objectives play a major if not the dominant role in the formation of reservation policy. It is possible that preexisting identity continues to be used
to determine reservation eligibility because there is no incentive for the
governments that dispense rents to do otherwise. The benefits of using
caste or tribe as a criterion are that members of castes are readily identifiable and thus easy to mobilize and that rents may potentially be bestowed on larger numbers of people, and hence more voters, than would
be possible if eligibility depended on wealth.
VII. Pressure-Group Theory and India’s Future
Applying pressure-group theory to the caste system and to Indian politics
makes possible a number of predictions that are in contrast to the conventional wisdom of other social scientists. These predictions are outlined below.
Identifiability and Caste Persistence
As demonstrated in Section IV, theorists have long found the caste system to be inconsistent with modernization in general and urbanization in
particular. However, the analysis in this article leads to a very different
prediction. Caste will continue to be politically important—and hence
important as a cultural phenomenon—as long as members are readily
identifiable. Even if urbanization and modernization eliminate the link
between jati and occupation, which seems reasonable, reservations based
on caste will continue to be a major feature of Indian politics as long as
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the eligibility of beneficiaries can be readily determined and the government is in a position to dispense valuable rents to various pressure
groups. The incentive to maintain caste identity is thus quite powerful.
Although castes historically were local phenomena, their increased
ability to mobilize within and even across states indicates that the corrosive effect of urbanization on caste identity and voting is substantially
exaggerated. As long as governments at all levels can engage in factional
rent distribution, and as long as there is a way to determine who is a
factional member and who is not, the low marginal cost of creating factions based on caste suggests its continuation. Only an ability of members of one caste to ‘‘pass’’ as members of another to obtain benefits
promised to the latter might upset this trend. However, it may be that
factions in India have developed a mechanism for dealing with this possibility. Gupta reports that increasingly, especially in urban areas, castes
can be defined by practices such as vegetarianism as well as by birth.
This means that even if lineage, the traditional identifying characteristic
for caste, becomes less reliable because of migration to an urban environment, an alternative means of identification may already be in place.
This suggests that even as urbanization and liberalization make the
jajmani system increasingly obsolete, the need to identify citizens on
the basis of caste for rent-seeking reasons is generating mechanisms for
preserving identifiability.
A problem may arise, however, if people will continually shift from
one group to another. The cohesion of preexisting factions might then
crumble. However, it is likely that the nature of reservations could prevent this problem. Recall that reservations are primarily in education,
public employment, and legislative representation. The acquisition of
nonspecific human capital generally is such a lengthy process that it will
seldom be optimal to repeat it. In addition, civil service protection makes
wholesale turnovers in bureaucratic staffing after an election very difficult, which means that the gains to a voter who constantly changes factions are minimal, and they become smaller as the voter ages. With
respect to switching by legislators, a member of parliament who continually changed factions would find it hard to get the support of voters
whose allegiance to a single faction was stable. An unstable equilibrium
in which voters can continually migrate from one faction to another is
thus possible. However, the long-term, stable nature of the rents that the
Indian government distributes makes this situation unlikely.
The Decline of All-India Parties
Another potential development in India’s immediate future is the increased importance placed on the concerns of preexisting factions in Indian politics at the explicit expense of other issues. Borrowing from P.
Satyanarayana, it is possible to define three types of Indian political parties.45 All-India or national parties are those with national themes and fol-
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TABLE 3

Percentage of Seats Held by All-India and Other Parties Since 1952

1952‡
1957‡
1962‡
1967‡
1971§
1977储
1980储
1984#
1989#
1991#
1996**
1998**

Communist*

Bharatiya Janata Party
and Jana Sangh†

Congress

Other

3.3
5.5
5.8
8.1
9.2
5.5
8.6
5.2
8.6
9.5
8.3
7.6

3.1
5.9
6.4
9.4
4.2
18.1
2.0
.4
16.1
23.3
30.0
32.8

72.4
70.1
73.0
53.7
68.0
28.4
65.1
76.7
37.3
44.0
25.4
26.0

21.2
18.5
17.8
28.8
18.6
66.2
24.5
24.5
38.1
27.2
39.0
33.7

* In 1964 the Communist Party of India (Marxist) broke away from the Communist
Party of India. The totals from 1967 and later are for the two parties together.
† The Jana Sangh reconstituted itself as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980.
‡ C. P. Bhambri, ‘‘Electoral Reform and Party System in India,’’ Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (New Delhi) 2 (October–December 1968): 46–54.
§ D. Butler, A. Lahiri, and R. Prannoy, A Compendium of Indian Elections (New
Delhi: Arnold-Heinamen, 1984).
储
C. P. Bhambri, ‘‘The Ninth Lok Sabha Elections,’’ in Political Parties in India,
1947–1991, ed. C. P. Bhambri (New Delhi: Vikas, 1991).
# Ramesh Thakur, The Government and Politics in India (New York: St. Martin’s,
1995).
** Election Commission of India Web site, http:/ /www.eci.gov.in.

lowings. The most prominent of these is the Congress Party, which from
1947 to 1967 dominated governance at the national level. However, Thakur notes that even during this period Congress was solicitous of castes
and tribes at the state level. Since the breakdown of Congress’s unchallenged hold on central power in 1967, national parties have often led coalitions in combination with other types of parties or smaller national
parties. ‘‘Factional parties’’ refers to parties that are defined exclusively
with respect to the concerns of particular groups, whether linguistic, regional, caste, or other.46 Finally, ‘‘personality parties’’ are those that are
formed, often as breakaways from other parties, primarily to accommodate the political ambitions of particular individuals.
Table 3 contains data on the changing fortunes of the Congress
Party and other all-India parties since 1952. An extraordinary trend has
been the unraveling of the Congress Party and the rise of smaller parties,
which are often defined around factional interests alone. The proportion
of seats in the dominant lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, that
go to nontraditional parties has expanded from approximately one-fifth
to one-third of all seats. The trend toward factionalism is even greater if
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies are considered to be fac-
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TABLE 4
Blocs and Parties, 1996 Elections (%)

Bloc
Upper castes
Other backward classes
Untouchables
Scheduled tribes
Muslims

Bharatiya
Janata Party

Congress
Party

Bahujan
Samaj Party

Other

40
24
13
18
2

26
21
31
39
31

0
2
12
1
1

24
53
44
42
66

Sources.—‘‘Congress Is No Longer a Rainbow,’’ India Today (February 2, 1998);
‘‘BSP Gets All Its Support from the Weakest,’’ India Today (February 2, 1998); ‘‘BJP
Still Has a Narrow Social Base,’’ India Today (February 2, 1998).

tional as well. Although Thakur defines the coalition led by the BJP as
a bloc of all-India parties, for our purposes it is at least in part factional.
Table 4 contains data from the 1996 national elections that indicate how
several groups in India allotted their votes among the BJP, the Congress
Party, other parties, and, for purposes of comparison, the Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP; one of the parties most explicitly aligned with dalit groups).
While Congress clearly draws from all of the listed blocs, the BJP is
tilted significantly toward the upper castes, and the BSP is clearly a
lower-caste party.47 Some subgroups of the BJP coalition, most prominently the Shiv Sena, are almost entirely upper-caste parties. Although it
is not accurate to describe the BJP as an exclusively upper-caste party,
it nonetheless draws its support disproportionately from these groups and
is substantially a factional party.
Some sense of the increasingly factional nature of Indian governance can be gleaned from table 5. It presents a list of seats won by all
parties in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections. The parties in italics are those
classified by India’s election commission as national parties. Such parties
garnered 383 out of 543 seats, or 70.5% of the seats. This is not a perfect
test for whether a party is factional, because some nonnational parties
(e.g., the Revolutionary Socialist Party) are presumably defined around
ideology and, more important for purposes of this article, because two
of the national parties, the BSP and BJP, are in large part factional. If
these two parties were so labeled, the seats held by other national parties
would be reduced to 200, or 36.8%.
The inference that factional parties are increasingly important in Indian politics is in agreement with the assessments of many scholars.48
The increasing role of factional parties is not an inconsequential development. Many issues that come before a national legislature are not about
the distribution of rents. The decline of all-India parties and the increased
importance of reservations and other rents to preexisting factions mean
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TABLE 5
Seats in Lok Sabha after 1998 Elections

Coalition or Member Party
Bharatiya Janata Party and
allies:
Bharatiya Janata Party
Samata Party
Shiv Sena
All India Dravida:
Munnetra
Kazhagam
Shiromani Akali Dal
Haryana Vikas Party
Ntr Telugu Desam Party
(Lakshmi Parvathi)
Biju Janata Dal
Trinamool Congress
Lok Shakti
Pattali Makkal Katchi
Marumalarchi Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam
Total
Congress and allies:
Indian National
Congress
Jharkand Mukti Morcha
Muslim League
Bharatiya Kisan
Kerala Congress (M)
Samajwadi Party in
Maharashtra
Republican Party of
India
Indian Union Muslim
League
Total

Seats
Contested

Seats
Held

383
51
80

178
12
6

20
8
4

18
8
1

5
12
29
35
4

0
9
7
3
4

5
636

3
249

471
14
⋅⋅⋅
24
...

141
0
2
0
1

3

0

19

4

2
533

0
148

Coalition or Member Party
United Front coalition:
Janata Dal
Telegu Desam Party
Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam
Tamil Maanila Congress
(Moonapar)
Communist Party of
India
Communist Party of
India (Marxist)
Asom Gana Parishad
All India Forward Bloc
Revolutionary Socialist
Party
Samajwadi Party
Maharashtrawadi
Gomantak
National Conference
Total
Others:
Rashtriya Janata Dal
Rashtriya Janata Party
United Goans Democratic
Party
Bahujan Samaj Party
Hariyana Lok Dal
Sikkim Democratic Front
Independent
Others
Total

Seats
Contested

Seats
Held

189
35

6
12

18

6

20

3

62

9

70
9
4

32
0
2

5
159

5
21

2
1
574

0
1
97

112
2

17
0

2
247
4
1
1,857
⋅⋅⋅
2,225

0
5
3
1
6
12
44

Note.—Parties in italics are those classified by India’s election commission as national parties.

that Indian governments find it progressively more difficult to obtain
mandates on issues of national concern. India is increasingly unable to
govern coherently when the issue involves foreign relations, nuclear
weaponry, or some other concern not easily translated into factional
arithmetic. However, a primary source of this inability, the inevitable
Balkanization of Indian politics as a result of the increasingly important
stakes in Indian rent seeking, is not given sufficient consideration in the
literature as a cause of India’s increasing governance troubles. Instead,
many scholars who study the matter draw the opposite conclusion. For
example, A. Kolhi believes that the solution lies in making either the
Indian state itself or Indian political parties more centralized and powerful.
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Economic Liberalization and Caste
Since the late 1980s India has undergone substantial economic liberalization by decreasing protection, liberalizing rules on foreign investment,
decreasing price controls, and privatizing some state enterprises.49 A
somewhat surprising implication of this article’s theory of Indian factions is that as liberalization proceeds (and as long as there are still significant outlets for the Indian governments to allocate rents) preexisting
identity is likely to become an ever more important element in India’s
political future. It is based on the belief that the unchaining of market
forces will result in a more dynamic, evolving economy that will increase the comparative advantage of caste and tribe as a basis for factional organization.
Liberalization increases Schumpeterian creative destruction. Firms
and industries thus rise and fall more rapidly, particularly in a developing
society. Factions based on common economic features (e.g., being a textile worker) therefore become more unstable and hence less desirable.
However, Indian liberalization as outlined above does not imply an end
to rent-seeking opportunities. Recall that most of the opportunities for
preexisting factions to pursue rents revolve around education, legislative
representation, and public employment. Of the types of liberalization
mentioned in the above paragraph, only the privatization of state enterprises impinges on the opportunities for preexisting factions to extract
rents, and then only to the extent that reserved public employment occurs
in easily privatized functions rather than in purely bureaucratic agencies.50 The rewards of being listed as an SC, ST, or OBC still loom large
as long as the channels for dispensing rents to these groups are largely
unaffected by liberalization, as seems likely.
If the government is still open to rent-seeking activity as liberalization proceeds, it will be rational for citizens to adopt more reliable forms
of factional organization, and caste and tribe, with their ready-made and
long-lasting (due to excludability) viability, will become relatively more
efficient. The decreased rents given to economic pressure groups raise
the relative reward given to organizing on the basis of preexisting social
criteria instead of economic considerations. Over time, rent seeking
should thus become more, rather than less, based on these forms of factional identity. The empirical implication of this insight is that caste and
tribe will become more important in Indian politics as time progresses,
regardless of specific changes in the private economy, as long as liberalization itself proceeds while substantial rents exist via channels such as
reservations. Note the stark contrast between this conclusion and sociological theories that assert that ‘‘modernization’’ should make caste, in
particular, untenable. The insights from pressure-group theory imply little about social custom associated with caste per se other than the need
to maintain identifiability as defined in Section II. However, these in-
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sights also imply an increased incentive to preserve factional identification and trade on it in political activity.
VIII. Conclusion
The wisdom of using reservations is clearly a complex question, and this
article is not intended to render a verdict on their value. However, the
study provides some insights into the nature of Indian governance and
society and the nature of pressure groups, particularly in developing societies, that should not be ignored. It may also be useful in analyzing the
factional dynamics of other societies with preexisting pressure groups,
for example, those based on linguistic or ethnic criteria. The results suggest that, regardless of changes over time in the relative wealth of the
recipients of rewards of reservations, rent seeking based on preexisting
criteria, whether based on caste, ethnicity, language, or something else,
will be difficult to dislodge once ensconced. There are important lessons
to be learned both from India and elsewhere.
Large-scale governmental distribution of rents based explicitly on
ethnicity or other preexisting identity is a fairly recent phenomenon. At
almost a half century, India’s system is older than that of every other
nation, although large-scale efforts of this type exist in other countries,
for example, Malaysia. With that caveat in mind, it is nonetheless disquieting that no society that has embarked on distribution on the basis of
preexisting identity has been able to declare victory and roll it back. India provides a vivid case study in which the introduction of ethnicityand caste-based distribution of rents by the government has led to a
steady expansion of such programs, even as there are as yet no claims
by their advocates that they are no longer needed. This is in explicit contrast to the original presumption that such programs would fade quickly
as the beneficiaries ‘‘caught up’’ with the larger society. Other societies
that are contemplating embarking on such a course would do well to
ponder the results from India, particularly in light of the sizable costs
rent seeking can impose on developing societies.
For the people of India, this is far from an academic question. Brass
and Kolhi have separately documented the pattern of steadily increasing
ethnicity- and caste-based violence from 1961 to the early 1990s, much
of it over the expansion of reservations. The question of whether economic growth will be rapid enough to make the disagreement over reservations predominantly nonviolent is an open one. Many of India’s founders advocated reservations and other methods of obtaining for India’s
spurned classes the equality that individual choices, in the market and
elsewhere, would not allow.51 In hindsight, it may be that the relentless
momentum of commerce will prove to be the most powerful force in
breaking down the aspects of India’s long-standing social structure that
have been examined here, to the extent that the population would find it
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desirable. However, whether the democratic factionalism that is so much
a part of modern Indian governance helps or hinders this process is an
open question.
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